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New Humanism 
Li Tonglu 
In a rapidly globalizing world, the development of modern Chinese culture in the 
twentieth century was inevitably a global process. Local competitions in the literary 
field reflected global trends, even as these drew on local cultures in interactions not 
readily describable in binary terms. During the May Fourth period radical thinkers of 
the New Cultural Movement, including Hu Shi (1891–1962) and Lu Xun (1881–
1936), celebrated Westernization, and their proposals rapidly became normative.1
However, the consecration of the New Cultural Movement cannot be fully 
understood apart from other cultural trends or the sociopolitical discourses of 
national salvation, modernization, and globalization: the dynamism of the era arose 
from the competition among individuals and social groups for status in the literary 
field. During this highly selective, highly exclusive process of icon formation, 
paradoxically only the most iconoclastic prevailed. Yet counternarratives remained 
to challenge the radical New Culturalists, among which one, New Humanism, was 
also a modern system of thought founded in the West. Thus Chinese New 
Humanism provides us with a rich case study of the mechanisms regulating cultural 
production. Furthermore, reexamining the questions it raised will help us rethink 
the problems of Chinese modernity, which went awry at certain critical historical 
moments. In the age of globalization, rethinking New Humanism’s historical roles 
will provide valuable references for resisting the dominance of global capitalism. 
Chinese New Humanism was the product of the intensified global interflow of 
ideas and personnel. Originally proposed by Irving Babbitt (1865–1933) and Elmer 
More (1864–1937), and inspired by Buddhist and Confucian philosophies, New 
Humanism opposed the moral decline fostered by relativist and determinist beliefs 
and by an increasingly materialistic American society. The movement’s central 
mission was to find a universally applicable code for humanity based on traditional 
philosophical teachings of the East and the West. New Humanism was introduced 
into the Chinese intellectual environment by Babbitt’s disciples Wu Mi (1894–1978), 
Hu Xiansu (1894–1968), Mei Guangdi (1890–1945), and Liang Shiqiu (1903– 87). 
Learning about New Humanism through the perspectives of the West, these 
overseas students reflected on the problems in China. Through Babbitt’s teaching, 
they saw a possible universal solution both for general human problems and for 
particular Chinese defects. They also realized, however, that it was problematic to 
take the modern West as their sole model, since Western society had internal 
problems and contradictions of its own. From Babbitt’s high regard for Confucius as 
a humanist, Wu, Hu, Mei, and Liang regained their confidence in the value of 
China’s own tradition, which had been marginalized by the New Cultural reformers. 
Babbitt’s students went home to challenge the “overall Westernization” championed 
by the New Cultural Movement thinkers and to propose their own vision of modern 
Chinese literature and culture.2 From the 1920s to the 1930s New Humanism 
haunted the literary field by functioning, though not exclusively so, as a 
counternarrative to the hegemonic views in the literary field. 
Consequently, New Humanism was tarred as a shadow of the New Cultural 
Movement. In the 1935 edition of the Compendium of Modern Chinese Literature 
(Zhongguo xinwenxue daxi), the first collective effort to canonize modern literature 
through historiography, New Humanism was slighted as “reactionary” to the New 
Literature (xin wenxue) in the introduction" (dao yan) to its second volume 
"Literary Debates" (wenxue lunzheng ji) written by Zheng Zhenduo (1898—1958).3
Both May Fourth radicals and the New Humanists deliberately polarized the d 
between them and tried to distinguish their own intellectual standing, which led to 
irreconcilable antagonism without a buffer. Once the May Fourth radicals had 
become the new cultural icons, New Humanism was repressed and consigned to 
oblivion in the literary-historical annals of mainland China. 
The reality, of course, was more complicated than the official story. In early-
twentieth-century China intellectual trends such as radicalism, conservatism, 
liberalism, and New Humanism, and their literary manifestations of classicism, 
nationalism, and cosmopolitanism, and interacted. Within the dynamic they formed, 
they not only contradicted but also infiltrated, complemented, stimulated, and 
mirrored each other. As the core component of the New Cultural Movement, literary 
revolution became a discourse in China with the publication of Hu Shi’s “Preliminary 
Proposal for Literary Reform” (“Wenxue gailiang chuyi”) in New Youth in 1917. Hu’s 
radical proposal had been generated through debates with Mei and other New 
Humanists in America. Hu argued that the mission of literary revolution was to 
adopt a new literary language, without which new thoughts and spirit could be 
neither expressed nor conveyed to their audience. He believed that in the twentieth 
century classical Chinese was a “dead language” and should give way to the “living” 
vernacular. Originally as a friend and later as an enemy of Hu, Mei held views 
increasingly divergent from Hu’s after studying with Babbitt and becoming a 
passionate proponent of New Humanism in 1915. Mei did not oppose literary 
revolution in general. What he contested was Hu’s idea of taking vernacular 
language as the model to follow, since it was not refined and therefore lacked 
eternal value. It was mainly Mei’s challenge that pushed Hu to develop his ideas of 
reformation.4
Like the hegemonic narratives it countered, Chinese New Humanism was not 
a unified cultural movement. It was a set of cultural choices among a loosely 
associated group of intellectuals. These choices, although historically repressed, 
were not dismissible singularities but instead were conditions indispensable to the 
functioning of the literary field. In this essay I delineate the roles New Humanism 
played in China, its internal contradictions and problems, and its intricate 
relationship with the hegemonic narratives about cultural production by examining 
the literary practices of three New Humanists who demonstrated, respectively, 
ideal/academic, political, and transcendental ways of engagement. 
In the early 1920s the New Humanists announced their vision of Chinese culture in 
response to the rise of the New Cultural Movement. They gained the name Critical 
Review school (Xueheng pai) from the journal the Critical Review, which they 
founded in Nanjing in 1922 to publicize their ideas.5 A passionate professor at 
Southeastern University in Nanjing and the editor of the Critical Review, Wu Mi 
played a central role in the circulation of New Humanism in China, incorporating its 
ideas into the curriculum and pouring his energy and personal funds into the 
journal. During its eleven- year lifetime the Critical Review published sixty-nine 
essays on Western culture, twenty of them on New Humanism (Wang, “Preliminary 
Study,” 94– 95).6 The journal also published essays on Chinese culture per se and 
in comparison with Western culture. Some essays criticized the New Cultural 
Movement. The appearance and practices of New Humanism determined the 
journal’s conservative image in the cultural field, especially when “promoting the 
national essence” became part of the journal’s mission. 
New Humanists countered the Western-oriented Chinese modernization 
project with a holistic view of culture that transcended time and space. They 
insisted that classical culture should not be deserted but, as the expression of life’s 
universal truths, should serve as a reference for the construction of the new culture. 
In other words, the new culture was to be not an invention breaking with the past 
but a gradual transformation of tradition. The New Humanists opposed the 
Darwinian, linear progressivism of the New Cultural Movement. Though it might 
hold some validity in the natural sciences, technology, commerce, and industry, 
they contended that in the humanities lay the timeless truths. Thus the newness 
that granted the radicals cultural capital was disqualified from setting the criteria 
for cultural creation. As the embodiment of universal truth, traditional learning was 
to be the resource of and final judge for modern cultural production. Traditional 
literary languages, modes of expression, and styles should be revered. Yet the New 
Humanists did not reject the West, as old-fashioned conservatives usually did. 
Rather, they considered the truth of humanity not only timeless but also spaceless. 
Different cultures equally manifested it; none of them could exhaust it. For New 
Humanists, there were substantial connections and resemblances between 
traditional Chinese culture and Western cultures. 
Their differences were secondary. They were equal branches of an integral 
human life that could illuminate each other in their different ways of articulating 
the same truth about humanity.7
The New Humanists regarded the New Cultural radicals as superficial, 
narrow-minded philistines who were mistaken both in their denial of the value of 
traditional Chinese culture and in their reduction of the West to its modern period.8
Following the decadent fashions of the twentieth-century Western world, the May 
Fourth radicals, with their “pseudo-Europeanization,” would lead Chinese culture 
into a debacle. While criticizing the views of May Fourth radical intellectuals, the 
New Humanists proposed alternatives. According to Mei, building a new culture 
would be a forty- to fifty-year project undertaken by erudite scholars with expertise 
in both Chinese and Western learning. They needed to do thorough research, make 
sound judgments, and apply refined methodologies. 
New Humanism helped Wu reimagine the subjectivity of Chinese culture. 
Born in Shanxi province, Wu received an excellent traditional education. In 1917 he 
was sent to study at the University of Virginia. In 1918, influenced by his friend Mei, 
Wu entered Harvard University to study under Babbitt and soon subscribed to his 
gospel of New Humanism. After all, New Humanism was not alien to him, since it 
was informed partly by traditional Chinese culture. Wu admitted that by “learning 
from Mr. Babbitt and Mr. More, I can say that I indirectly inherited the Western 
tradition and absorbed its core values. Carrying these back home, I can better 
understand the merits of Chinese culture and the greatness and righteousness of 
Confucius.”9 For Wu, the value of traditional Chinese culture lay not in its 
Chineseness per se but in its universal validity and perpetuity. In his understanding, 
Chinese culture was based on Confucianism and supported by Buddhism. Western 
culture was born of the union of Greek and Roman philosophies and literatures with 
Christianity. To create a new culture, it was necessary first to understand these old 
cultures (“On the New Cultural Movement,” 15). In the light of New Humanism, Wu 
reinterpreted concepts such as “self-denial and return to propriety” (keji fuli), 
“faithfulness and forbearance” (zhongshu), and “the golden mean” (zhongyong) of 
the Confucian school as necessary tenets for the modern human being.10 Wu’s 
acceptance of New Humanism, therefore, was a journey to explore and reaffirm the 
universal value of traditional Chinese culture, which he accorded a status equal or 
superior to that of Western culture. 
However, these ideal ideas encountered difficulty in practice. Despite Wu’s 
hard work in editing, Critical Review was a failure, one of many problems 
encountered by New Humanism on a practical level. After its debut, the journal 
unwisely waged war on the May Fourth radicals and promoted the use of classical 
Chinese as its own exclusive medium. On behalf of the New Cultural Movement, Lu 
Xun criticized Wu’s proposal for scholarship, pointing out inconsistencies between 
Wu’s argument and examples, on the one hand, and his imperfect grasp of 
 historical context, on the other.11 Lu Xun also derided the Critical Review as 
“nothing more than the fake aura of some fake antiques gathered at Nanjing,” 
noted numerous misuses of classical Chinese, and concluded that the journal’s 
proposals were not worth the public’s attention, since the authors themselves could 
not carry them out flawlessly.12 Though Lu Xun acknowledged that his criticism was 
based only on volume 1, and though he never critically analyzed the theories 
behind New Humanism, the damage to the journal’s image was irreparable. Indeed, 
as Liang wrote, potential supporters of New Humanism were scared off by the 
journal’s use of classical Chinese.13 Generally, the Critical Review school paid too 
much attention to secondary issues, such as “promoting the national essence” and 
using classical Chinese; as a result, what was originally the main thrust of New 
Humanism became a side issue in the cultural debates. The New Humanist group 
held similar theoretical positions, yet on an organizational level its conflicts about 
editing were left unsolved. Mei proposed a spontaneous style of editing, but Wu 
insisted on a more structured one. Wu acknowledged Lu Xun’s criticism and 
complained that it had not been his decision to publish the pieces by Shao Zuping 
(1898–1969) on which much of that criticism centered. Dissatisfied, Mei and Hu left 
for America again in 1924 and 1925, respectively. Thereafter Mei never published in 
the Critical Review. Wu’s effort to sustain the journal was misunderstood by his 
colleagues as an overbearing will to control. He showed his disappointment in his 
diary: 
  
The Critical Review is a public instrument for China and for the world, not 
the private property of its initial dozen members. It is not a private 
organization but the ideally most perfect and lofty journal. Therefore I 
devoted myself to it and worked carefully day after night to edit the 
cautiously chosen materials. I also recruited a highly qualified staff. What I 
wanted was improvement. If it always publishes Mr. Shao Zuping’s works, 
how can the Critical Review be any different from the Beijing and Shanghai 
tabloids run by degenerate literati? What purpose does it serve in today’s 
China? Why should I waste my time and energy on it?14 
 
The journal also suffered financially. It had been set up as a purely academic 
nonprofit organization, funded by its members. At the beginning it received 
institutional support from the vice president of Southeastern University, Liu Boming 
(1887–1923), but this ended after his death. To avoid political interference, the 
journal’s editors rejected potential donations from politicians. In 1933, the year 
Babbitt died, Wu quit his job, unable to solve the internal disagreements and 
financial difficulties. The Critical Review canceled its publishing contract with 
Zhonghua Press, which had complained about its low sales. Soon it ceased 
publishing. 
  
If Wu’s practice was fundamentally academic, although unavoidably ideological, 
Liang expressed the political potential of New Humanism. In the late 1920s and 
1930s, with the rise of proletarian movements, the literary field was dominated by 
Marxism, intermingled with Leninism and Stalinism because of the mediation of 
Russia and the USSR. The progressive- minded young Marxists stigmatized the New 
Cultural radicals as bourgeois, conservative, and reactionary or as the “dregs of 
feudalism” (fengjian yunie). Once again the New Humanists, especially Liang, stood 
against this hegemonic discourse. Liang had started his literary career as a believer 
in the radical ideas of the New Cultural Movement and Romanticism. In 1923 he 
praised Byron’s poems as emancipating, and in 1924 he went to Harvard, intending 
to challenge New Humanism.15 But after taking courses with Babbitt, he gave up his 
original ideas on literature and became a convert (“On Mr. Babbitt,” 211–17). Liang 
came to perceive literature as a Romantic and classical binary, and he now 
criticized the New Cultural Movement as Romanticist, irrational, chaotic, and lacking 
in discipline, elegance, abstinence, and any appreciation of literary form.16 His 
criticism was seconded by Zhou Zuoren (1885–1967). In the literary field Liang was 
distinguished by the polemical challenge, proceeding from his understanding of 
humanity, that he posed to Marxist views of literature. Humanity transcended the 
limitations of race, nation, and, most important in Liang’s argument, social class.17 
Indeed, Liang insisted that universal humanity was the only legitimate theme of 
literature. He particularly criticized the instrumentalization of literature by Marxists, 
who manipulated it as a weapon for class struggle. 
Liang was involved in several debates with the Marxists. His main opponent 
was Lu Xun, who converted to Marxism in the late 1920s. Lu Xun faced harsh 
attacks from a group of young orthodox Marxists at that time. Having witnessed the 
bloody slaughter of communists by nationalists in 1927, he observed the limitation 
of social Darwinism and experienced a personal crisis. In his debate with Liang, Lu 
Xun admitted that he had turned to Marxism to find not only a method of analyzing 
society but also a means to self-reflection. Most young Marxists in the literary field 
were members of the former Creation Society (Chuangzao She) and the Sun 
Society (Taiyang She), such as Guo Moruo (1892–1978). Guo had positioned Lu 
Xun as the “dregs of feudalism,” who did not understand the ideology of the 
bourgeoisie, to say nothing of the ideology of the proletariat. Lu Xun was a “double 
antirevolutionary” (erchong fangeming) to both capitalism and socialism. Guo’s 
attacks had induced Lu Xun to explore Marxism, to engage in the leftist movement, 
and finally to become its figurehead. However, Lu Xun was unsatisfied with the 
reductive, dogmatic, and clannish views of other Marxists. Occasionally his 
criticisms and Liang’s coincided. However, Lu Xun’s disagreements with other 
Marxists became secondary once he had started to debate with Liang, because his 
position determined his way of argument: speaking for a group while retaining his 
 own understanding of Marxism. Therefore, from a Marxist perspective, Lu Xun was 
not representative. Nevertheless, he became Liang’s major opponent, though 
possibly because of his prestige rather than his Marxist views. For younger 
challengers in the literary field, debating a prestigious figure is risky, but it offers 
the chance of amassing cultural capital. 
Liang’s basic position was undeniably aristocratic, and the same was 
generally true of New Humanists both in China and in America. Liang claimed that 
good literary works were the preserve of social elites, inaccessible to most.18 He 
insisted that a small number of geniuses created civilization and deserved to lead 
the masses.19 In his view, revolutions occurred when leaders lacked humanity; their 
mission was to get rid of unqualified leaders, not to subvert the political system. He 
attributed social stratification to differences in talent among members of society. In 
most cases, Liang did not equate the proletariat with the uneducated majority. Yet 
his analysis of the proletariat was condescending and unavoidably bourgeois: 
 
Originally, the proletariat did not have class consciousness. It was their 
merciful and radical leaders who brought it to them. This concept [class 
consciousness] is merely a tool that the leaders use to unite them and to 
motivate them to fight. A member of the proletariat can accumulate some 
property if he is ambitious. He only needs to work hard and to be honest his 
whole life long. This is the legitimate way to struggle for one’s living. After it 
becomes united, however, the proletariat becomes a class. Its members 
want to have organization. They are a group. As a result, they start to 
assume political and economic power by unconventional means and become 
the ruling class. They want revenge. But their only instrument to achieve it 
is their populousness. “Majority,” “mass,” and “group” are the weapons for 
them to use to rebel. (“Does Literature?” 110) 
 
The proletariat was obviously not Liang’s concern when he discussed literature. Lu 
Xun mocked his attitude as that of a rich dignitary in ancient times, who taught 
poor workers to climb up to the upper class by their honest labor.20 This criticism 
associated Liang’s opinion with that of the bourgeoisie and called his vaunted 
disinterest into question. 
There is tension in Liang’s theories. His aristocratic point of view did not lead 
to the promotion of a partisan literature for the upper classes, nor did it keep him 
from proposing a literature of universal humanity. Universal humanity became the 
cornerstone of Liang’s arguments in criticizing Marxist views of literature. However, 
he never gave humanity a clear definition or description. He admitted that it “is a 
complicated issue (and who can clearly state the elements of it?). However, it is 
this complicatedness that make it possible for us to analyze it: imagination and 
emotion are subjected to reason.”21 This humanity is beyond the regulation of time, 
space, and social strata. Liang admitted that the agony embedded in historical 
 contexts, such as imperialist invasion and oppression from warlords, could be the 
subject of literature. However, it was more important for literature to represent 
universal concerns, such as life’s vicissitudes, the sense of being played by destiny, 
or one’s inner hesitation and conflict. Liang argued that a worker and his boss 
possess an identical humanity, whatever differences of inheritance, education, and 
economics separate them. They feel the same uncertainty about life and death. 
They both desire love. They both may take pity or be paralyzed with terror, and 
they both have ethical ideas (“Does Literature?” 112). Obviously, Liang replaced 
the concrete sociopolitical contents of humanity with abstract psychological 
categories. He did not, as other New Humanists would have done, refer to great 
philosophical teachings, to rationality, or to morality in illustrating universal 
humanity. The leftist camp responded quickly. Lu Xun pointed out that in a class-
based society, humanity, sentiments, and agonies were deeply rooted in social 
distinctions, which made a universally shared humanity impossible (“‘Hard 
Translation,’” 236). 
Given the unresolved contradiction between universality and hierarchy, Liang 
admitted that universal humanity had not been sufficiently elaborated. Still, it 
became the foundation on which he based his vision of the literary world and 
pursued an agenda that would deny the Marxist literary framework and the social 
practices associated with it. For Liang, revolution was an unacceptable disturbance 
of normal social and moral order. The proletariat as a social class was not a real 
entity but a fabrication that enabled the poor and their leaders to gain power. For 
him, since literature belonged to the realm of the universal, temporal events should 
be excluded from it. Liang regarded revolution as an event within a limited social 
environment that had nothing to do with literature. The “revolutionary literature” 
promoted by Marxists thus became an oxymoron. In response, Lu Xun defended the 
proletariat’s appropriation of literature for its own ends. Social position 
predetermined people’s tastes. He reasoned that if literatures describing an 
unchanging universal humanity were great literatures, then literatures concerning 
the biological features of human being  would be much greater in that they were 
much more universal.22 
After Liang went to Taiwan, he continued to criticize Lu Xun. Liang regarded 
his arguments not merely as strategies to counter the rise of Marxism, however, 
but as lifelong beliefs guiding his literary practice. In his later years he gave up 
literary criticism and devoted himself to essay writing and translation. Liang’s 
essays evoke a nostalgic world enhanced by refined tastes in daily life and by 
“normal” human emotions aloof from the problems of race, nation, politics, class, 
and gender. These essays manifested his view of humanity more vividly than his 
literary criticism. Liang also single- handedly translated all the works of 
Shakespeare, to him the very incarnation of the universal humanist. 
 
It was Lu Xun’s younger brother, Zhou Zuoren, who bridged the vast gap between 
 New Humanists and the May Fourth radicals. Zhou started his literary career as the 
leading literary theorist of the New Cultural Movement. One of the most learned 
men of letters in his time, he was influenced by various intellectual trends. He 
refused to subscribe to any particular one to the exclusion of others; nor could he 
synthesize them into a theory of his own. He approached New Humanism not 
through Babbitt or other Chinese New Humanists but through a reflection on the 
whole modernization project. In fact, Zhou criticized the Critical Review in the early 
1920s as a way to express his anxiety about the possibility of an archaist 
movement opposed to modernization.23 After the ferment of the New Cultural 
Movement, Zhou distanced himself from the mainstream May Fourth intellectuals 
when he realized that the promoters of the new culture behaved exactly the way 
proponents of the “old” would have done: once dominant over the literary field, 
they would secure their position by repressing dissidents. Disillusionment motivated 
him to rethink the logic of modernity in the Chinese context. Though Zhou was not 
a professed New Humanist, his rationalism, comprehensive knowledge of classical 
and modern humanities, respect for Confucianism and Greek culture, promotion of 
self-cultivation, rejection of the institutionalization or instrumentalization of 
literature, and skepticism toward progressive secularism made him a model figure 
of New Humanism. Furthermore, Zhou endorsed and enriched New Humanism, 
whose leaders had focused mainly on classical literature, with knowledge from the 
modern humanities and sciences. 
In 1918 Zhou set the humanistic tone for New Literature, which had some 
similarities with New Humanism.24 He advocated “individualistic humanism” (geren 
zhuyi de renjian benwei zhuyi), which became a constant theme throughout his life. 
In this initial statement he argued that New Literature needed to have a humanistic 
nature, because human beings had evolved from animals. On the one hand, 
humans had basic desires that were identical to those of animals and should not be 
repressed by cultural conventions; they were legitimate and needed to be respected. 
On the other hand, humans should not overindulge in sensual pleasures, for the 
internal life of a person was much more sophisticated and refined than that of an 
animal. The human body and soul were in a harmonious relationship. Zhou’s 
dualistic view of humanity was based on his understanding of Western culture, 
which drew on Greek and Jewish beliefs that emphasized the “flesh” and the “soul,” 
respectively. A normal human life existed within the range set by these two 
parameters. This became clearer in “Requirements for New Literature,” in which 
Zhou argued that New Literature “is humanistic. It is not animal in nature. Neither 
is it divine.”25 His argument was not only based on traditional Western culture but 
also drew on Zhou’s own encyclopedic knowledge of cultural anthropology, sexual 
psychology, folk culture, and biology, all of which provided insights into human life 
and feelings and into the laws of things (renqing wuli). In 1940s he expressly 
promoted a “Confucian humanism,” which for him possessed the fundamental spirit 
of world culture. Zhou held his basic theoretical position when some of his peers 
 changed. He considered that humanity either fell, constrained by cultural 
conventions, into a world dominated by desire or rose into a transcendental domain 
of belief, depending on historical context.  
Beginning in the late 1920s, Zhou observed that the gravest threat to 
humanity came from forms of belief, whether secular or religious, that succumbed 
to irrationality. From this perspective, the goals of a belief appeared unattainable, 
yet its adherents tended to become deluded into pursuing their ideals at any cost 
while attacking other beliefs. As a result, they renounced their individuality and 
merged into mobs, whose frenetic emotions unavoidably led to violence. Zhou’s 
conclusion was based mainly on his readings in medieval religious history, Chinese 
cult activity, and Japanese Shinto. To show how extreme and absurd a belief could 
become, he included in many pieces examples of churches burning people alive to 
rescue their souls. He used the Boxer Rebellion to analogize the fanatical 
xenophobia in vogue among intellectuals under the name of patriotism and 
nationalism. In general, Zhou was fond of Japanese culture, but he disapproved of 
Shinto, since it enchanted people into an irrational state of mind. He even 
attributed Japan’s invasions of and ruthless killing in other Asian countries to Shinto. 
However, he did not simply deny the power of belief but provided a rational 
analysis of it. In his account, salvation through belief was impossible, but belief still 
symptomatized normal psychological needs, through which human agonies, 
sentiments, and spiritual requirements were expressed. Zhou reinterpreted 
religious writings as documents of secular literature or philosophy, not as 
enunciations of the truth. He traced the possible connections between the Bible and 
modern Chinese literature both in ideas and in expressions.26 He cited Ecclesiastes 
in reflections on how human beings face the vanity of living in an ultimately 
meaningless world. His answer was to observe the madness and absurdity in the 
human world from a distance, even though nothing was new under the sun and 
nothing could be changed.27 Zhou expressed the feeling of solitude and the desire 
to join with others by discussing a Buddhist rite to build up interpersonal ties in the 
next life.28 In analyzing a Chinese local cult, Hongyang Jiao, he explored the longing 
to return to an ultimate home in response to a call from the Eternal Mother.29 He 
himself followed Buddhist rites at his mother’s funeral. He also portrayed himself as 
a Buddhist monk and in so doing marked his distance from the mainstream. Zhou’s 
recognition of religion as an expression of inner feeling was a denial of 
institutionalized religious belief. For his own purposes, he displaced the central idea 
of belief while retaining its form. 
Zhou also took belief as an epistemic protomodel with which to carry out 
literary and social criticism. Religious belief revealed sociopsychological problems; it 
reflected and allegorized the whole of modern Chinese society on a structural level. 
Speculating on quasi-religious phenomena, Zhou rejected contemporary social 
movements, including the nationalist and communist movements, as systems of 
belief. In his view, so-called modern society was not modern, because the “new” 
 social movements repeated the logic of the old ones. “There is nothing new under 
the sun” became his motto. In 1925 he cited his favorite writer, Havelock Ellis 
(1859–1939), to express his rejection of the idea that the world progressed linearly 
toward a telos.30 However, in a world without a transcendental and teleological aim, 
how should human beings live? To observe life dispassionately and to enjoy the 
moments in a leisurely way against the background of a chaotic world became his 
only choice: 
 
We are all on the way [to death]. Some laugh and sing, thinking of going to 
heaven. Some cry, thinking that they are going to hell. Some are drunk and 
sleeping. We just want to go slowly, seeing the scenery pass by, listening to 
others talk, and trying to enjoy the bitterness and joy we deserve. As for 
the route, whether it is from Xisi Pailou [a place in Beijing] to the south or 
from Dongdan Pailou [a place in Beijing] to the north, what does it 
matter?31 
 
Zhou also took issue with idol worship. For him, the problem with the New Cultural 
Movement lay not in its iconoclastic critique of tradition but in its replacement of old 
icons with new ones. Among these, he singled out his elder brother to attack. In 
Zhou’s view, Lu Xun had betrayed his earlier commitments in favor of Marxism and 
had pursued status as a new idol, which he enjoyed. Zhou’s comments may have 
been influenced by the brothers’ broken relationship. Nevertheless, he was astute 
when it came to the unchanging pattern of power relations during the social 
transitions of his time. The new idols worked as priests to lead the masses to the 
ideal place— the communist society—which in Zhou’s eyes was as false as paradise. 
For that reason Zhou was unwilling to join the communist, or any institutionalized, 
movement. He expressed his suspicions mostly in an indirect manner by alluding to 
religious texts when writing about communism. The communist movement was 
doomed to bring violence and disaster, which happened often during his time. Zhou 
denied the legitimacy of instrumentalizing literature for propagandistic purposes in 
social movements. The purpose of literature was to reflect on the quotidian life of 
individuals, not to carry an ideological message; literature that did the latter 
betrayed itself. However, Zhou did not propose to replace politicized literature with 
a literature of undisciplined human emotions and irrationality. He conceived of a 
literature dealing with “normal” themes in a rational, individual, and sober style. 
For this reason he preferred essays to poetry. In his essays he blended his 
mediated subtle feeling, manifold knowledge, and rational ideas. 
 What remained of importance for Zhou was to enjoy everyday life after 
denying the transcendental. The year 1928 marked his self-exile from direct reality 
to the self-sufficient world of knowledge.32 He started to observe social and 
intellectual problems from a historical perspective, exploring and constructing the 
quotidian world. He devoted himself to writing about leisure activities, gardening, 
 pets, customs, food and drink, folklore, daily rites, bathrooms, and festivals. In his 
reading notes on the reading notes by intellectuals from the Ming and Qing 
dynasties, Zhou praised those who focused on daily life but regretted that such 
writings were rare. Most intellectuals, concerned with morality, civil service 
examinations, and politics, remained naive about the richness of human sentiments. 
One’s attitude toward everyday life became Zhou’s criterion for an intellectual. The 
quotidian life Zhou imagined was not value- free. Rather, it reflected his indirect 
criticism of grand narratives. In the quotidian world all such narratives, about 
revolution, class, and the usefulness of literature, were irrelevant. Everyday life 
took center stage and became the ultimate signifier of the significance of human life. 
 
The contest of New Humanism with cultural hegemonies provides a unique yet 
problematic perspective from which to rethink the logic of Chinese modernity. In 
The Monster That Is History David Der-wei Wang shows how enlightenment turned 
dark, how revolution became a bloodthirsty monster, and how the fancied utopia 
turned out to be dystopia.33 It is exactly through the continuous repression of 
challenging narratives such as New Humanism that monstrosity becomes part of 
our history. As a counternarrative, New Humanism tried to provide a universally 
valid proposal to transcend the restrictions of political reality and historical context. 
The nonsituational, nonhistoricizing approach of New Humanism, however, was just 
as problematic as, if not more so than, the targets of its criticism. New Humanism’s 
failure in China was a consequence not merely of repression at the hands of 
hegemonic powers but of the movement’s own shortcomings. 
 Unable to institutionalize itself, New Humanism achieved only limited 
influence, but for this very reason it could not be manipulated as a political tool. Its 
position at the periphery of the cultural field enabled it to form a relatively 
independent cultural space in which academics could develop. Prestigious scholars 
such as Wang Guowei (1877–1927), Chen Yinque (1890–1969), Tang Yongtong 
(1893–1964), and Liu Yizheng (1880–1956) all had close relationships to the 
Critical Review. The practice of Wu fostered the birth of comparative literature as a 
discipline in China. Wu is even credited as the father of that discipline.34 In 1979 
Wu’s best student, Qian Zhongshu (1910–98), published his magnum opus in 
comparative literature, Limited Views (Guanzhui bian).35 Qian’s voluminous work 
can be regarded as the result of numerous imagined seminars attended by scholars 
of different disciplines in the humanities from the East and the West throughout 
time. Qian wrote in classical Chinese, which raised some eyebrows but also 
reflected the lingering charm of New Humanism in the cultural sphere. 
 In the post–Cultural Revolution era, writers and critics started to criticize the 
revolution by appealing to universal humanity and other liberal thoughts. Historical 
traumas, alienation from humanistic values, and disillusionment about the 
veneration of Mao were abundantly expressed. The criticism even led to suspicions 
 about the socialist state ideology itself and the goals of communism. In response, 
the Chinese Communist Party launched two political counteroffensives: The 
“Antispiritual Pollution” movement in 1983 and the “Antibourgeois Liberalization” 
movement in 1987–88. In the 1990s, facing the expansion of New Liberalism, some 
scholars in Beijing and Shanghai initiated a debate about “humanistic concerns”; 
anxious about the growth of materialism, they called for intellectuals to champion 
the preservation of humanistic values in China. In the age of globalization, New 
Humanism could be rejuvenated to counter the New Liberalist logic of global 
capitalism, which only celebrates the freedom of capital, and to explore alternative 
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